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IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
ACQUISITION REGULATION: WHYPACORD GOT IT WRONG
The case of PacOrd, Inc. v. United States1 exemplifies why
people should follow their gut instincts. PacOrd, a subcontractor,
hesitated to work with the general contractor, A & E Industries,
in performing ship repair work for the United States govern-
ment. PacOrd knew of A & E's reputation for not paying its
subcontractors. 2 To entice PacOrd to do the work, a federal gov-
ernment contracting officer allegedly promised that the govern-
ment would take measures to guarantee payment to PacOrd.
Relying on this promise, PacOrd agreed to do the work.4
PacOrd's fears of nonpayment came to fruition when A & E hid
behind the shield of bankruptcy and the government refused to
honor its alleged promise.5
In addition to the mistake of neglecting its gut instinct,
PacOrd erred by contracting with the federal government with-
out securing a writing. Under the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion (FAR), a contract with the United States government must
be in writing to be enforceable.6 In PacOrd, however, the Ninth
Circuit called into doubt the existence of this writing require-
ment by opening the door to an implied-in-fact contract. 7 Assum-
ing that a writing requirement exists, PacOrd raises the issue of
whether the regulatory writing requirement should bar the en-
forcement of implied-in-fact contracts in government acquisi-
tions. This Note explains the importance of a writing require-
ment and the policy reasons for its consistent enforcement in
1. 139 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
2. See id. at 1321.
3. See id. The contracting officer allegedly promised that the government would
require A & E to establish an escrow account to guarantee payment to PacOrd. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
7. See PacOrd, 139 F.3d at 1323 (remanding to the district court to determine
whether an implied-in-fact contract existed).
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light of history, case precedent, and the circumstances unique to
government contracts.
The express language of the FAR supports the existence of a
writing requirement.8 The FAR has the force and effect of law,9
and by definition requires that a contract be in writing, unless
otherwise authorized.' ° The presence of a writing requirement is
supported further in the context of agency authority." The FAR
charges all parties to a government contract with knowledge of
the writing requirement.12 A contracting officer has the authori-
ty to bind the government only when the contract meets all the
requirements of the law, including the FAR's requirement that
the contract be in writing.'
3
As the first section of this Note explains in greater detail, the
import of history, the definition of a contract under the FAR,
and the scope of authority vested in the contracting officer all
combine to prohibit the enforcement of a contract unless a writ-
ing exists.' 4 The second section of this Note highlights the case
history surrounding the subject of writing requirements in gov-
ernment contracts. Although the cases do not demonstrate unan-
imous support for a writing requirement, it is clear that PacOrd
chose the minority position by opening the door for a court to
later find an implied-in-fact contract.' 5 The third section of this
Note attempts to resolve the doubt PacOrd created regarding
the role of a writing requirement for government contracts by
highlighting the benefits of a virtual statute of frauds 6 for gov-
ernment contracts, and distinguishing it from the traditional
criticisms associated with statutes of frauds.
Strict enforcement of the writing requirement under the FAR
serves important evidentiary and channelling functions, 7 but a
8. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1998).
9. See 44 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (1994).
10. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
11. See infra notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
13. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1(b).
14. See infra notes 81-150 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 21-77 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 151-95 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note,
the term "virtual statute of frauds" is used as a shorthand to refer to strict enforce-
ment of the FAR's writing requirement, as opposed to viewing the writing require-
ment as a mere formality that may be overcome by theories of implied contracts.
17. See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
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per se enforcement of the writing requirement has its own dan-
gers. Enforcement of the writing requirement in a case such as
PacOrd may be unfair, and perhaps result in the perpetration of
a fraud by the government." Accordingly, the fourth section of
this Note recognizes the major criticism of a virtual statute of
frauds: that it will perpetuate, rather than prevent, fraud.' 9 Gov-
ernment abuses of the requirement should be curtailed by a
narrow exception to the requirement allowing an implied-in-fact
contract upon a showing by the plaintiff of some blatant act
rising to the level of fraud by the government. °
Whether the government defrauded PacOrd by not honoring
the alleged oral agreement the contracting officer made is debat-
able, especially considering the lack of intent on the part of the
government to cause PacOrd to rely on the contracting officer's
statement. Absent such a showing of government fraud, the
regulatory writing requirement should be enforced because par-
ties contracting with the government should know the law, and
therefore, know to obtain a writing before beginning any perfor-
mance to their detriment. Consistent enforcement of the writing
requirement absent a showing of fraud will prevent fraud, in-
crease the certainty of when the government will be bound, and
decrease transaction costs.
THE ANOMALY KNOWN AS PACORD
The Ninth Circuit's decision in PacOrd gives new life to the
argument that the writing requirement for the formation of
government contracts may be ignored when a party alleges a
contract that is not memorialized in a writing. After the govern-
ment refused to honor the oral promise in PacOrd, PacOrd sued
to have it enforced. 2' The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment on the basis "that the alleged
contract was not in writing as required by the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation."22 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit faced the issue
18. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text.
21. See PacOrd, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1320, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
22. Id. at 1321.
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of whether an implied-in-fact contract may be found despite a
regulatory writing requirement for formation of a contract.23
PacOrd took the controversial position that "[i]mplied-in-fact
contracts with the government have been enforced despite
statutory or regulatory requirements that contracts be in writ-
ing."24 The disturbing holding created the possibility of enforcing
a FAR contract "so long as [the plaintiff] can establish sufficient
facts, beyond a mere oral agreement, for the court to infer the
existence of an implied-in-fact contract."25 Such a result dulls the
thrust of the writing requirement under the FAR by undermin-
ing its goals of certainty, consistency, and lower transaction
costs.
The PacOrd court relied heavily on Narva Harris Construction
Co. v. United States.2" In Narva Harris, the court ignored the
writing requirement, choosing instead to enforce an implied-in-
fact contract out of a fear that the government would escape
liability." In his dissenting opinion in PacOrd, Judge T.G. Nel-
son distinguished Narva Harris on two grounds:28 first, that
Narva Harris was not decided under the FAR,29 and second, that
"[ilt is just plain wrong."3" Judge Nelson argued that "[w]ith
thousands of contracts and hundreds of billions of dollars in play
every year, the Government simply has to know to whom and for
what it is obligated."3 Two legal principles guided Judge
Nelson's dissent: the language of the regulation and the concept
of agency authority.32 First, Judge Nelson interpreted the rele-
vant FAR sections33 to contain a virtual statute of frauds, thereby
23. See id. at 1323.
24. Id. at 1322. The court in PacOrd defined an implied-in-fact contract as "a
true contract, the agreement of the parties being inferred from the circumstances .... "
Id. at 1323 n.2 (quoting Narva Harris Constr. Corp. v. United States, 574 F.2d 508,
511 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1978)).
25. Id. at 1323.
26. 574 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
27. See id. at 510-11.





33. See 48 C.F.R §§ 1.602-1(b), 2.101 (1998).
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precluding enforcement of the contract absent a writing. 4 Sec-
ond, he posited an agency authority argument, asserting that
the proposition noted in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v.
Merrill,5 that a party contracting with the government bears
the risk of determining if the government officer has the author-
ity to do so, should control the case.
36
In Kenney v. United States,3 7 the court reached a middle
ground. In Kenney, the plaintiff negotiated with the government
in an attempt to provide human resource development and
training.38 After a change in command, the negotiations became
a low priority for the government and eventually the negotia-
tions ceased.39 Although the plaintiff never conducted any train-
ing courses for the government, the plaintiff sued the govern-
ment for breach of contract. 40 The Kenney court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment for two reasons.4'
First, the court held that there were insufficient facts to infer
from the circumstances an implied-in-fact contract. Second, the
court noted that even if an implied-in-fact contract existed, the
government could avoid its enforcement because the contracting
officer lacked authority to bind the government.43 Although
Kenney acknowledged Narva Harris and implied-in-fact con-
tracts in government contracting, the Kenney court delivered a
blow to this line of reasoning by introducing the agency author-
ity argument in such a context.44
34. See PacOrd, 139 F.3d at 1324 (Nelson, J., dissenting) ('he executive branch
of the Government has made it clear that contracts coming within the FAR must be
in writing.").
35. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
36. See ic at 384.
37. 41 Fed. Cl. 353 (1998).
38. See id. at 354-55.
39. See id. at 355-56.
40. See id. at 356.
41. See id. at 359-60.
42. See id. at 359.
43. See id. at 360.
44. The Kenney court showed Narva Harris respect and appeared to give Narva
Harris credibility, but it did so with a wink and a nudge. Rather than stopping af-
ter determining an implied-in-fact contract did not exist under the facts, the court
proceeded to point out that even if such a contract existed, the contract would be
unenforceable because the contracting officer lacked authority and "the United States
2000] 713
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PacOrd, Kenney, and Narva Harris all broke from the prece-
dent established by United States v. American Renaissance
Lines, Inc.,4" which found a virtual statute of frauds based on a
statute similar to the writing requirement found in today's
FAR.46 A later case criticized American Renaissance Lines, de-
scribing that court's statutory interpretation as "unique and
appear[ing] to be a misapplication," given the statute's original
budgetary control purpose.47 The American Renaissance Lines
court, however, did not ignore that the statute's original purpose
"was to prevent executive officials from excessive or inappropri-
ate spending,"8 but simply believed that the writing require-
ment would protect "both sides from the possibility of fraud or
misinterpretation by the other."49 On this basis, the court found
a virtual statute of frauds and, therefore, refused to enforce the
oral contract.50
Just four years later, the court in American General Leasing,
Inc. v. United States51 reaffirmed the principles of American
Renaissance Lines. American General Leasing interpreted a stat-
ute similar to the one in American Renaissance Lines to bar the
enforcement of an oral contract. 52 The court in American General
Leasing reasoned that, because "[tihe Federal Procurement Reg-
ulations have the force of law,"53 and the "parties contracting
with the Government are charged with having knowledge of the
law governing the formation of such contracts," 4 an oral agree-
ment is unenforceable when an applicable procurement regu-
government may generally deny unauthorized acts of its agents." Id. For a discus-
sion of the interrelation between agency authority and the FAR's writing require-
ment to weave a virtual statute of frauds, see infra notes 119-50.
45. 494 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46. See id. at 1062 (acknowledging that the statute did "not follow the typical
statute of frauds format," but nonetheless holding that the statute did require that
government contracts be in writing "and that contracts which are merely oral are
not enforceable").
47. Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) %1 12,851, at 62,558
(1977).
48. American Renaissance Lines, 494 F.2d at 1062.
49. Id. at 1063.
50. See id. at 1062.
51. 587 F.2d 54 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
52. See id. at 57-58.
53. Id. at 58.
54. Id.
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lation requires a writing to bind the government.55 Similar to
the statute at issue in PacOrd, the applicable procurement regu-
lation in American General Leasing defined a contract as the
"'establishment of a binding legal relation... includ[ing] all
types of commitments which obligate the Government to an ex-
penditure of funds and which except as otherwise authorized are
in writing.'56 In concluding that the statute barred enforcement
of an oral contract, the court limited its holding to situations in
which there has been no actual performance of the contract, no
detrimental reliance, and the parties intended that a binding
contract could be created only by a formal writing.5"
Over the next decade it became clear that the Narva Harris
decision was the minority position as subsequent decisions fol-
lowed the American Renaissance Lines holding.58 The Narva
Harris court tried to distinguish itself from American Renais-
sance Lines by drawing a distinction between a "naked, express
oral contract" and an implied-in-fact contract.59 This distinction
is tenuous at best in the face of a regulation requiring a writing.
The writing requirement serves an evidentiary purpose as well
as making the resolution of contract disputes more efficient.6 °
Enforcing a contract without a writing, whether inferred from
the circumstances (implied-in-fact) or based solely on parol evi-
55. See id.
56. Id. at 57 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.208) (codified as amended at 48 C.F.R. §
2-2.101(A) (1998)).
57. See id. at 58.
58. See, e.g., Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d 1429,
1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the contracting officer lacked the authority to con-
tract without obtaining the required written approval), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1111
(1999); Aronson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 38 F.3d 1110, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (re-
fusing to enforce an oral contract in part because the contracting officer did not
comply with the writing requirement); Edwards v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 411, 422
(1991) (same); Prevado Village Partnership v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 219, 224 n.3
(1983) (noting that if the regulation required a writing for a contract, then no con-
tract existed absent such a writing); Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. United States, 1 C1.
Ct. 641, 644 (1982) (holding that an oral acceptance is insufficient when a regulation
requires a written acceptance). But see PacOrd, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1320,
1322 (9th Cir. 1998); Kenney v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 353, 357 (1998).
59. Narva Harris Constr. Corp. v. United States, 574 F.2d 508, 510 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
60. For a more detailed discussion of the evidentiary and channelling functions a
writing requirement serves, see infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
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dence (oral contract), cuts against the policy of providing clear
evidence of the contract so that the government will know when
and to whom it is bound.
The majority of cases since American Renaissance Lines and
Narva Harris have made no such distinction but have chosen
instead to enforce the writing requirement for government con-
tracts. In Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. United States,6' the court
held that if a statute or regulation requires a written accep-
tance, then an oral acceptance is insufficient.62 The Lomas court
focused on the controlling regulation's use of the word "shall" to
imply that such writing was mandatory.6"
The case of Prevado Village Partnership v. United States"
generally reaffirmed American General Leasing and applied its
principles to the context of an alleged implied-in-fact contract.
The Prevado court noted that the FAR charges a party to a con-
tract with the government with knowledge of the law and regu-
lations governing the formation of such a contract.65 Prevado
also recognized that when applicable governmental regulations
require a writing, "no contract exists absent such a final, execut-
ed writing."66
In Edwards v. United States, 7 the court cited a statutory
provision defining a contract to necessarily include a writing to
support its holding that no oral agreement could be enforced.68
The Edwards court further noted "that generally oral agree-
ments provide a very shaky basis for the granting of relief by
way of money judgments."69
61. 1 Cl. Ct. 641 (1982).
62. See id. at 644 (citing SCM Corp. v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 459, 464
(1979); American Gen. Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 367, 373-75 (1978);
McCarty Corp. v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 768, 774-75 (1974); International Tele-
phone & Telegraph v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 11, 24-26 (1972); G.C. Casebolt Co.
v. United States, 190 Ct. Cl. 783, 788-90 (1970)).
63. See id.; cf. 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1(b) (1998) ("No contract shall be entered into
unless the contracting officer ensures that all requirements of law ... have been
met." (emphasis added)).
64. 3 Cl. Ct. 219 (1983).
65. See id. at 224 n.2.
66. Id. n.3.
67. 22 Cl. Ct. 411 (1991).
68. See id. at 419.
69. Id. at 423.
716 [Vol. 41:709
WHY PACORD GOT IT WRONG
Most recently, the rationale supporting strict enforcement of a
regulatory writing requirement has been applied in Aronson v.
Resolution Trust Corp.7" and Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects
v. United States.71 In Aronson, the court refused to enforce the
oral agreement at issue because the controlling federal procure-
ment regulation required the agreement to be in writing and to
be approved by the association's board of directors.72 The
HarbertlLummus court focused on the relationship between a
contracting officer's authority and a writing requirement.
Harbert/Lummus involved the government's loan guarantee
issued to Agrifuels Refining Corporation to guarantee payment
to Harbert/Lummus.73 Harbert/Lummus requested an accelerated
payment schedule that the contracting officer ultimately denied
despite the fact that some government officials had approved the
plan.74 The HarbertlLummus court noted that the contracting
officer "never expressed to Harbert/Lummus an intent to enter
into a contract to modify th[e] written schedule." 5 Relying heavi-
ly on the doctrine of agency authority, the Harbert/Lummus
court noted that even if there had been a contract modification,
it would not be enforceable because the contracting officer had
no authority to bind the government without obtaining the re-
quired written approval.76 The HarbertlLummus court cited
American General Leasing for the proposition that a contracting
officer who fails to meet a writing requirement lacks authority
70. 38 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. 142 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
72. See Aronson, 38 F.3d at 1112-13. Faced with seemingly mandatory precedent,
the Ninth Circuit in PacOrd tried to distinguish Aronson on the basis that in the
latter the agent lacked authority because he did not obtain approval from the board
of directors. See PacOrd, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998).
The attempt by the PacOrd court to distinguish Aronson is unpersuasive for two
reasons. First, the court in PacOrd failed to recognize that the contracting officer in
that case similarly lacked authority to bind the government without a writing, un-
less otherwise authorized. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1997). Second, PacOrd completely
overlooked the court's focus in Aronson on the agent's failure to reduce -the agree-
ment to writing as required by the applicable regulation. See Aronson, 38 F.3d at 1112.
73. See HarbertlLummus, 142 F.3d at 1431.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1432.
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to bind the government.1 Clearly, the majority of cases have
adhered to the historical precedent for requiring a writing in
government contracts, thereby creating a line of cases that fa-
vors a writing requirement for government contracts.
THE VIRTUAL STATUTE OF FRAUDS UNDER THE FAR
There is no precise statute of frauds governing government
contracts, but "the concept is well established that the Federal
Government must be protected from fraud and cannot be legally
bound by contract in the absence of a written agreement."7 8 As
detailed above, although the proposition does not enjoy unani-
mous support, the majority of cases have found a writing re-
quirement for government contracts and have refused to enforce
such contracts absent a writing.79 History, the language of the
FAR, the purposes behind the FAR, and the doctrine of contract-
ing officer authority all support the idea of a virtual statute of
frauds for government contracts."
The Guiding Hand of History
Historically, Congress and the courts both have emphasized
the importance of a writing to evidence a contract in government
contracts. It has been noted that "Congress historically had es-
tablished controls over federal contracts, and one of the most
important was the requirement for a written contract."8' Courts
have interpreted statutes similar to today's FAR as the equiv-
alent of a statute of frauds. The American Renaissance Lines
holding was not an innovation but was in accord with case law
dating back to the Civil War Era. For example, an 1862 statute
required that "all contracts issued by the Secretary of War, the
Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior be in
writing."" The primary purpose of the statute was "to impose a
77. See id. at 1433.
78. Howard W. Cox, FASA and False Certifications: Procurement Fraud on the
Information Superhighway, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 7 (1995).
79. See supra notes 21-77 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 81-150 and accompanying text.
81. Cox, supra note 78, at 8.
82. Id. at 7 (citing 12 Stat. 411 (1862)).
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restraint upon the officers themselves, and prevent them from
making reckless engagements for the government." 3 To meet
this goal the statute made it "unlawful for contracting officers to
make contracts in any other way than by [a] writing signed by
the parties."8" The necessary conclusion that followed was to
prohibit all other modes of contracting.8"
The Supreme Court interpreted this 1862 statute in Clark v.
United States86 as the equivalent of a statute of frauds. In
Clark, the owner of a steamboat orally agreed to rent the steam-
boat to the Army.88 After the steamboat wrecked, it was deemed
a "total loss. "89 When the owner sued the government for the
value of the steamboat, the government relied on the 1862 stat-
ute to deny liability for the action of its officer.9" The Court held
the statute to be a virtual statute of frauds and noted that it
was "manifest that there is no class of cases in which a statute
for preventing frauds and perjuries is more needed than in
this."9 Although the Court denied the steamboat owner's claim
for the value of the steamboat, the owner did recover the value
for the use of the vessel on a quantum meruit basis.92 The stat-
utes at issue in Clark and American Renaissance Lines were the
predecessors to the FAR governing government contracts. As is
evident from the cases interpreting these predecessor statutes,
history supports interpreting the FAR to require a writing before
the government will be bound.
The Language of the FAR
The language of the FAR is clear with respect to the writing
requirement and is in accordance with past statutes interpreted
by the courts to be a virtual statute of frauds. Congress delegat-
83. Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539, 542 (1877).
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
87. See id, at 542.
88. See id. at 539.
89. Id. at 540.
90. See id, at 541.
91. Id. at 542.
92. See id.
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ed the authority to draft the FAR to the Department of Defense
(DoD), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Na-
tional Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA).9" These
agencies' collective interpretation of whether the FAR has an
absolute writing requirement, that is, no implied-in-fact con-
tracts may be found under the FAR, is crucial because "consider-
able weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter."
94
Under the Chevron test, review of an agency's construction of
its own statute is a two-part analysis. First, a court must exam-
ine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue."95 If the congressional intent is clear, "that is the
end of the matter."96 If not, then the court must determine
whether the agency's interpretation of the statute on a point
that is not specifically addressed "is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."9 The test for permissible construction
in this situation is reasonableness. 9  To evaluate the
construction's reasonableness it is necessary to examine the
regulatory language, the legislative history, and the policies to
be served under the FAR.
In applying the Chevron test to the FAR, a court must first
examine whether Congress had a clear intent regarding the
writing requirement. Specifically, the court must ask whether
finding an implied-in-fact contract goes against the intent of
93. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2302b, 2303(a) (1994) (noting that the FAR applies to the
DoD, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of
the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and NASA); 40 U.S.C. § 751() (1994) (granting the
authority in the GSA to prescribe regulations to carry out its functions which in-
cludes procurement of property for the government); 42 U.S.C. § 2473(c)(1) (1994)
(granting NASA the power "to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules
and regulations governing the manner of its operations and the exercise of the pow-
ers vested in it by law"). The source of the FAR derives from 48 Fed. Reg. 42,102
(1983) (noting that the DoD, GSA, and NASA, all under the auspices of their rele-
vant statutory authority, issued the FAR to replace the procurement regulations of
each of these agencies), and 54 Fed. Reg. 5054 (1989), unless otherwise noted.
94. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
95. Id. at 842.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 843.
98. See id. at 845.
720 [Vol. 41:709
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Congress, acts indifferently to such intent, or furthers the intent
of Congress. The answer appears to be indifference. Contracting
methods were not a concern to Congress; instead Congress want-
ed different agencies to have the ability to formulate regulations
to carry out the agencies' functions, which might include govern-
ment contracting. 99
A clear intent on the part of Congress regarding a writing
requirement for government contracts is lacking; therefore,
courts must next look to the language of the regulation and the
construction of the regulation by the agencies administering the
FAR. Under the FAR, a contract is defined as including a writ-
ing unless otherwise authorized.0 0 Furthermore, under the FAR,
the contracting officer has the authority to bind the government
only when all the requirements of law have been met.'01 Presum-
ably, if the FAR has the force and effect of law, and therefore,
the law requires a writing, then the contracting officer does not
have the authority to bind the government without a writing (or
authorization) because he would then not meet a requirement of
law. Finally, the language of the regulation gives specific exam-
ples of what constitutes an enforceable contract under the FAR
including bilateral instruments, awards, notices of awards, job
orders, task letters, letter contracts, purchase orders, and bilat-
eral contract modifications.0 2 The fact that the drafters took the
time to give examples of contracts, all of which contain writings,
creates a strong presumption, direct from the language of the
regulation, that contracts under the FAR must be in writing.0 3
99. Congress ensured that the agencies administering the FAR would be able to
carry out their duties but did not control to a large extent how these agencies could
contract, leaving that instead to the agencies' discretion. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
2473(c)(1) (1994) (granting NASA the power to make regulations to carry out their
duties); id. § 2473(c)(5) (allowing NASA to enter into contracts to perform its duties,
but not prescribing how to contract, with the minor exception of encouraging the
participation of small businesses).
100. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1998).
101. See id. § 1.602-1(b).
102. See id § 2.101. Although the language of this provision recognizes that the
mentioned contracts are not exclusive, see id., it remains significant that the provi-
sion mentions no examples of contracts without a writing.
103. This conclusion is buttressed by the requirement that the contract be signed
which obviously presumes a writing. See iUL § 1.601(a).
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The next step is to survey the regulatory history of the FAR.
In promulgating the FAR, DoD, GSA, and NASA jointly issued a
statement regarding the overall purpose of the FAR.' °" One of
the goals in drafting the FAR was to "produce a clear, under-
standable document that maximizes feasible uniformity, in the
acquisition process." °5 Consider how a statute of frauds, univer-
sally enforced, aids the spirit and purpose of the FAR by further-
ing the interests of clarity and uniformity. A consistently en-
forced statute of frauds makes it clear to the government, and
government contractors, that without a writing and absent un-
usual circumstances,0 6 the government will not be bound under
the FAR. The existence of a writing is a much simpler issue to
resolve than litigating whether a contract can be inferred from
the circumstances absent a writing.' The simplicity of the rule
and its consistent enforcement puts government contractors on
notice not to rely to their detriment on promises without a writ-
ing. Moreover, the costs of litigation are reduced significantly be-
cause these issues should be fairly easy to settle in an efficient
manner. Such a result is consistent with the policy of the Execu-
tive Branch in procuring goods and services "to ensure the eco-
nomical and efficient administration and completion of Federal
Government contracts."
0 8
Another goal in drafting the FAR was to "implement recom-
mendations made by the Commission on Government Procure-
ment, the Federal Paperwork Commission, various Congressio-
nal groups, and others."09 The study and research that accompa-
nied the implementation of the FAR demonstrates the care in-
104. See 48 Fed. Reg. 42,102 (1983).
105. Id.
106. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text (discussing a narrow exception
for fraudlike circumstances).
107. That is, litigating the existence of an implied-in-fact contract.
108. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1995), reprinted in 40 U.S.C. § 486
(1996 Supp. II). Although Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir.
1996), held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted Executive Or-
der Number 12,954, the court based its decision on the regulatory nature of the Ex-
ecutive Order regarding a labor law issue. See id. at 1339. Although the court over-
ruled the substance of the executive order, the policy of the Executive Branch with
regard to efficiency in government contracting remains unaffected by the court's deci-
sion.
109. 48 Fed. Reg. 42,102 (1983).
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volved in drafting the regulations. To go against the clear lan-
guage of the FAR would also go against the careful study and
recommendations of the various groups that offered input into
how the process of government contracting should be conducted.
To find implied-in-fact contracts goes against the clear language
of the FAR requiring a writing unless otherwise authorized.
The final step is to examine the policy to be served. Enforcing
the statute of frauds under the FAR serves three policy goals:
predictability, uniformity, and lower transaction costs in the
formation of government contracts.11 ° Predictability in govern-
ment contracts should be the paramount goal of all parties in-
volved. The government puts billions of dollars annually into
government contracting, and such a burden cannot be taken
lightly.1  The government must know when and to whom it is
bound." Guessing whether a contract should be inferred from
the circumstances undercuts this goal because it creates doubt
as to whether the government is bound. If the government can
point to a writing in every case, then the government can better
assess its overall obligations, and thus manage its costs more
effectively. The flip side reveals a benefit for the contractors as
well. By following the simple rule of obtaining a writing, con-
tractors have no doubt whether they have incurred obligations.
Instead, the writing expresses both the clear duties of the con-
tractor and its compensation. The implied-in-fact view breeds
uncertainty and may pressure a contractor to begin work with-
out a writing, thus risking lost compensation for services ren-
dered. The clear notice that the writing requirement provides
can decrease the competitive feeling to take a chance and begin
work for the government based on a mere oral promise just to
beat the other contractors to the punch. If every contractor
knows the government will not be bound absent a writing, then
no contractor should feel pressure to proceed on an oral promise
because the contractor knows that doing so will return no fruits
for its labor.
110. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
111. See Brian R. Levey, Tortious Government Conduct and the Government Con-
tract: Tort, Breach of Contract, or Both?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
112. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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A second policy goal of the FAR is uniformity. One goal in
drafting the FAR included "provid[ing] for coordination, simplici-
ty and uniformity in the Federal acquisition process."" The
drafters intended the FAR to address the concern of "reduc[ing]
the proliferation of agency acquisition regulations."" Before the
FAR, different regulations applied depending on what agency of
the government a contractor was dealing with."5 Deciphering
which regulations applied made contracting with the govern-
ment a very difficult maze through which to run."6 The idea of
uniformity in regulations was conceived to make contracting
with the government a far less frustrating ordeal." Requiring a
writing in all cases of government contracting furthers this goal
of uniformity. The converse would necessarily entail differing
and contradictory results far too often. Inevitably,, court deci-
sions will differ on the same set of facts regarding whether a
contract was implied-in-fact, promoting doubt as to whether the
contractor should obtain a writing. The contractor who risks
performing the work without a writing may get the contracting
job and benefit if the oral contract is honored, or if a court en-
forces it as an implied-in-fact contract. The risk, however, may
be great if the contract is not enforced in the face of the
government's breach. Conversely, the contractor who does not
risk a court finding an implied-in-fact contract, and consequently
waits on a writing before beginning performance, still bears the
113. 48 Fed. Reg. 42,102 (1983).
114. Id.
115. Before the FAR, procurement agencies were governed according to their civil-
ian or military status. See Steven W. Feldman, Traversing the Tightrope Between
Meaningful Discussions and Improper Practices in Negotiated Federal Acquisitions:
Technical Transfusion, Technical Leveling, and Auction Techniques, 17 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 211, 216 n.8 (1987). The Defense Acquisition Regulation governed most military
procurement agencies, whereas the Federal Procurement Regulation controlled civil-
ian agencies. See id.
116. See, e.g., Richard C. Hatch, The New Federal Acquisition Regulation: An Im-
provement?, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1984, at 13, 17 (acknowledging the FAR's attempt "to
clarify the maze of regulations affecting the U.S. Government acquisition process").
117. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (1998); see also Charles F. Szurgot, Comment, The Buy
American Act: Reverse Discrimination Against Domestic Manufacturers; Implications
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 on the Rule of Origin Test, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 737, 759 (1993) (noting that the adoption of the FAR in 1984 "helped clarify gov-
ernment procurement by subjecting all agencies . . . to a coherent body of laws").
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risk of the government choosing another contractor whose finan-
cial pressures, coupled with government-imposed time con-
straints, encourage it not to wait for a writing. There are risks
involved and no matter which side the contractor chooses he
risks losing money. If a writing is uniformly required, regardless
of a court's determination of an implied-in-fact contract, all con-
tractors know which path to take: obtain a .writing before begin-
ning any work. To do otherwise would open the door to the risk
of the government not honoring the promise. In the case of a
writing, if the government does not honor its part of the bargain,
the remedy is quick and painless: present the writing and secure
a judgment in the contractor's favor.
A final policy benefit served by consistent enforcement of the
writing requirement under the FAR is that it reduces the costs
of contracting. This result is consistent with the stated goal of
the FAR to "[mlinimize administrative operating costs."118 Strict
enforcement of the writing requirement will lower contracting
costs for both the government and the contractor in two signifi-
cant aspects. First, the government will expend less time and
money monitoring its contracting officers. With a writing, the
government can examine the writing to determine if the officer
acted appropriately. Without a writing, the government has no
way to know all of the oral assurances made by its officers. Con-
sequently, the conduct of the contracting officers may go largely
unchecked. Second, the litigation costs associated with determin-
ing the existence of a contract will decrease given that the exis-
tence of a writing should resolve the uncertainties that lead to
litigation. These policies, taken together with the regulatory his-
tory and language of the FAR, point toward a construction of the
FAR that absolutely requires a writing before the government
can be bound.
Contracting Officer Authority Under the FAR
The language of the FAR, its regulatory history, and public
policy all support consistent enforcement of the writing require-
118. 48 C.F.R. § 1.102(b)(2).
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ment." The regulatory writing requirement under the FAR may
be inferred similarly on the basis of a contracting officer's au-
thority to contract. 12 Under the FAR, "[c]ontracting officers1
may bind the Government only to the extent of the authority
delegated to them."122 The FAR limits a contracting officer's
authority to enter into a contract. Specifically, a contracting
officer cannot enter into a contract without "ensur[ing] that all
requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other
applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have
been met." 23 Finally, by its terms, the law requires the contract-
ing officer to contract in writing." The inevitable conclusion is
that because contracting officers can contract only in writing,
unless otherwise authorized, the contracting officers have no au-
thority to bind the government to an implied-in-fact contract. 2 5
Those contracting with the government must know the scope
of a contracting officer's authority to bind the government.2 6 In
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,27 the Supreme Court
best stated the duty of those contracting with the government:
Whatever the form in which the Government functions, any-
one entering into an arrangement with the Government takes
119. See supra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
120. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1(a) (1998).
121. A contracting officer is "[tihe person executing or terminating a contract on
behalf of the government." W. NOEL KEYES, GovERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 50 (2d ed. 1996).
122. 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1(a) (footnote added).
123. Id. § 1.602-1(b).
124. See id. § 2.101 (defining a contract as "all types of commitments that obli-
gate the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except as
otherwise authorized, are in writing").
125. This line of argument is consistent with the court's analysis in
HarbertlLummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
In HarbertlLummus, the Department of Energy (DoE) required all contracting offi-
cers to obtain written approval for contract modifications that exceeded in value a
certain "dollar threshold." Id. at 1432. Without the written approval, the
HarbertlLummus court concluded that the contracting officer lacked authority to
bind the DoE to an oral contract. See id.
126. Indeed, a contractor has no reason not to know the scope of the contracting
officer's authority because "[i]nformation on the limits of the contracting officers' au-
thority shall be readily available to the public and agency personnel." 48 C.F.R. §
1.602-1(a).
127. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who pur-
ports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of
his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly
defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation,
properly exercised through the rule-making power.
128
The government cannot be bound by an agent who attempts to
enter into a contract without satisfying the regulatory require-
ments. 2 9 A party to a contract with the government is charged
with knowledge of the law governing formation of the contract.'
As previously noted, a contract under the FAR is presumed to be
in writing.'3 ' For example, it is important to note the presump-
tion of a writing in the requirement that the contracting officer's
"name and official title must be typed, stamped, or printed on
the contract."13 2 The policy rationale for not allowing a contract-
ing officer to bind the government beyond the contracting
officer's authority is based on the governmental delegation of
powers.
133
Under the doctrine espoused in G.L. Christian & Associates v.
United States, 1 4 contracting officers have the authority to con-
tract only in accord with the regulations that have "the force and
effect of law."13 In light of the Christian doctrine, two questions
must be answered. First, does the FAR have the force and effect
of law, and second, what does the FAR have to say about the
contracting officer's authority to bind the government? If the FAR
does have the force and effect of law, and there is a writing re-
128. Id. at 384.
129. See HarbertlLummus, 142 F.3d at 1433 ("[Algency procedures must be fol-
lowed before a binding contract can be formed."); Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United
States, 671 F.2d 445, 449-50 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the contracting officer
lacked the authority to enter into the contract without complying with the require-
ment of a written application); Kenney v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 353, 358 (1998)
([T]he United States government may generally deny unauthorized acts of its
agents.").
130. See Prevado Village Partnership v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 219, 224 nn.2-3
(1983); American Gen. Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 54, 58 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
131. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
132. KEYES, supra note 121, at 54.
133. See id. at 55 ("In a government of delegated powers, no activity may be un-
dertaken by the government except pursuant to such power.").
134. 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
135. KEYES, supra note 121, at 41; see Christian, 312 F.2d at 424.
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quired for the contracting officer to bind the government, then a
contracting officer cannot bind the government to an implied-in-
fact contract because that is beyond the scope of his authority.3 6
Federal procurement regulations, such as the FAR, have the
force of law.3 7 Furthermore, a study of the regulatory language,
its history, and the policies to be served have shown that the
FAR requires a writing. 3 ' The case law interpreting the prede-
cessor statutes to the FAR supports this conclusion.' 39 The im-
pact of an agreement entered into by a contracting officer with-
out the authority to do so is significant. It has been noted that
"[clontracting officers have unique authority to bind the govern-
ment and if an agent is without authority, payment under a
contract will generally be refused."'4 ° Furthermore, "lack of
knowledge of actual authority is normally not reason enough to
hold the government liable if such authority is absent."'
136. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1998) (establishing that "except as otherwise autho-
rized," contracts must be in writing).
137. See 44 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (1994) (noting that the Code of Federal Regulations
has legal effect); American Gen. Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 54, 58 (Ct.
Cl. 1978); see also KEYES, supra note 121, at 40-41 ("Regulations published in the
Federal Register have the force and effect of law- i.e., they are binding on federal
agencies and the general public.").
138. See supra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Aronson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 38 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable because the controlling
regulation required the agreement to be in writing and gain approval of the
association's board of directors); Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct.
641, 644 (1982) (holding that if a statute or regulation requires a written accep-
tance, then an oral acceptance is insufficient); American Gen. Leasing, 587 F.2d at
58 (refusing to enforce an oral agreement in the face of an applicable procurement
regulation requiring a writing to bind the government, when there has been no actu-
al performance of the contract, no detrimental reliance, and the parties intended
that a binding contract could be created only by a formal writing).
140. KEYES, supra note 121, at 51.
141. Id. at 55-56; see also Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting" that those contracting with the government bear the
risk of determining the scope of the contracting officer's authority and that "this risk
remains with the contractor even when the Government agents themselves may have
been unaware of the limitations on their authority"); Kenney v. United States, 41
Fed. Cl. 353, 357 (1998) ("[The burden is on plaintiffs to ascertain the scope of au-
thority of those government officials with whom they deal."). A leading commentator
in the field of government contracts, Ralph C. Nash, noted that "contractors must
aggressively find out the limits of the contracting officer's authority or risk damage
to their 'financial health.'" Major David A. Wallace et al., Contract and Fiscal Law
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The impact of an agreement made by a contracting officer
without the authority to do so is equally apparent in the context
of an alleged implied-in-fact contract." An essential element of
an implied-in-fact contract is that the "[contracting] officer
whose conduct is relied upon must have had actual authority to
bind the Government."' Given the writing requirement under
the FAR and the rule that an agent cannot contract beyond the
scope of his authority, the necessary conclusion to be drawn is
that a government contracting officer cannot enter into an oral,
or an implied-in-fact contract.1' Note, however, that there is an
Developments of 1998-The Year in Review, ARMY LAW. Jan. 1999, at 1, 4 (quoting
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Contracting Authority of Government Employees:
Handle With Care!, 12 NASH & CIBINIC REP. No. 50, 141 (1998)).
142. See, e.g., KEYES, supra note 121, at 57 ("Although a contractor may be able
to recover costs based on implied-in-fact contract to pay for such costs there can be
no recovery if the contracting officer lacked the requisite authority to bind the gov-
ernment.").
143. Petrini v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 41, 46 (1989) (applying this rule, the
court found that the controlling government regulation requiring a writing precluded
finding an implied-in-fact contract in part because the contracting officer did not
have such authority); see also OAO Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 91, 98-99
(1989) (noting that an agent of the government can bind the government only to the
extent of its authority and that no implied-in-fact contract could be formed if the
agent did not have such authority).
The doctrine of apparent authority is no defense to a contracting officer's lack of
actual authority to bind the government. See, e.g., Consortium Venture Corp. v.
United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 47, 49 (1984) (holding that the doctrine of apparent authori-
ty is not applicable to the federal government), affd, 765 F.2d 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
KEYES, supra note 121, at 62 ("'[N]o one may rely upon the apparent authority of
an agent of the government' and 'the government may not be estopped by the action
or representation of an agent not within the scope of his actual authority. .... "
(quoting United States v. Zenith-Godley Co., 180 F. Supp. 611, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
affd, 295 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1961))).
144. See, e.g., Chavez v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 540 (1989) (noting that "equita-
ble exceptions" to the law of contract are labeled more properly as contracts implied-
in-law, and that the formation of an implied-in-fact contract depends on the authori-
ty of the contracting officer to bind the government, regardless of the court's "good
conscience"); Spring St. Found., Inc., 94-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 9 26,737, at 133,046 (1994)
(finding no implied-in-fact contract because the government representative lacked the
authority to modify the contract). One further argument supports this conclusion.
When both parties contemplate a writing, then there can be no implied-in-fact con-
tract. See, e.g., Maimon v. United States, 219 Ct. C1. 684, 686-87 (1979) (holding
that a government agent lacked authority to bind the government through an oral
statement, especially when both parties intended their agreement to be completed by
a formal writing). Because the FAR mandates a writing requirement, see 48 C.F.R. §
2.101 (1998), and parties to a contract with the government are charged with knowl-
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obvious and easy way to otherwise authorize a contracting offi-
cer to bind the government without a writing: the government
could expressly give this authority to the contracting officer in
the warrant.145 Express authorization communicates the gov-
ernment's choice to allow the contracting officer to bind the gov-
ernment without a writing, and such choice is evidenced in the
warrant, simplifying any subsequent litigation of the existence
of an implied-in-fact contract.'
In PacOrd, the government did not otherwise authorize the
contracting officer to bind it without a writing.14 Strict enforce-
ment of the writing requirement in PacOrd would have left
PacOrd without compensation for work completed.1' Although
sympathy majr side with PacOrd,'49 the law and policy must, for
the greater good, side with enforcement of the writing require-
ment. 50
edge of the existing laws, see Prevado Village Partnership v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct.
219, 224 nn.2-3 (1983); American Gen. Leasing, 587 F.2d at 58, then certainly both
parties must be presumed to contemplate a writing. If a writing is contemplated,
then no implied-in-fact contract may be found. Cf. New Am. Shipbuilders, Inc. v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that there is no intent
to be bound until all agency procedures are followed and that, until then, no en-
forceable contract exists regardless of oral assurances or implied-in-fact theories).
145. See Elyce K.D. Santerre, From Confiscation to Contingency Contracting:
Property Acquisition on or Near the Battlefield, 124 MIL. L. REV. 111, 126 (1989).
The "warrant" (also known as the "Certificate of Appointment") is the means used to
delegate contracting authority. See id.
146. Cf. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1998) (noting that the government can, apart from a
writing, "otherwise authorize" its contracting officers to enter into contracts). See
generally Santerre, supra note 145, at 125-27 (discussing a contracting officer's au-
thority to bind the government).
147. Although not expressly stated by the court, this is implicit in its factual dis-
cussion. See PacOrd, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1320, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998).
148. Note that under such a rule, PacOrd might attempt recovery on a quantum
meruit basis. Yet, the United States paid A & E for its services and should not be
forced to pay a second time. The only quantum meruit action PacOrd could bring
would be against A & E, yet PacOrd already has a breach of contract action against
A & E. Either way, PacOrd must stand in line as any other creditor against the
bankrupt A & E.
149. The Supreme Court justified a similarly harsh result in Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947), on the rationale that "'[mien must turn
square corners when they deal with the Government' . . . [because of] the duty of
all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public trea-
sury." Id. at 385 (quoting Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S.
141, 143 (1920)). The "square corner" to turn in the case of government contracts is
simply to obtain a writing to evidence the contract.
150. Cases in which the contracting officer contracts beyond the scope of his au-
20001 WHY PACORD GOT IT WRONG 731
THE RATIONALE FOR STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRITING
REQUIREMENT IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
The endurance of a law depends on its underlying rationale.
The PacOrd decision raises the issue of whether the writing
requirement under the FAR should be strictly enforced or aban-
doned. "In deciding whether the requirement of writing for any
particular category... ought to be retained, the advantages of
retaining that category must be weighed against the potential
harm or injustice likely to result from retention."151 The courts
should adhere to the statutory writing requirement under the
FAR for the following reasons. First, the writing requirement
serves the evidentiary function needed in contract law.15 2 Prelim-
inarily, it should be noted that "[i]t is beyond question that the
bulk of the procurement community is composed of dedicated,
hardworking, and honest public employees and contractors."'53
Moreover, there is a "presumption that government officials act
conscientiously and in good faith in the discharge of their du-
ties."1"4 Nevertheless, the dangers of fraud in contracts require
that "even today certain important transactions should be re-
quired to be evidenced in writing in order to be enforceable." 55
thority have been described as "a classic example of why contracts are put in writ-
ing." HTC Indus. Inc., 93-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 25,560, at 127,312 (1992) (holding that a
technical representative of a contracting officer had no authority to approve cost
overruns under either the Limitations of Costs clause or the letter appointing the
technical representative).
151. INSTITUTE OF LAW RESEARCH AND REFORM, STATUTE OF FRAUDS 6 (1979)
[hereinafter STATUTE OF FRAUDS].
152. It is important to note the fear of the court in Clark v. United States, 95
U.S. 539 (1877), if oral contracts could bind the government:
The facility with which the government may be pillaged by the present-
ment of claims of the most extraordinary character, if allowed to be sus-
tained by parol evidence, which can always be produced to any required
extent, renders it highly desirable that all contracts which are made the
basis of demands against the government should be in writing.
Id. at 541-42.
153. The Model Procurement Code Project Staff, Overview of the Procurement Pro-
cess, Related Frauds, and the Model Procurement Code, 1984 A.B. SEC. PUB. CONT.
L. & SEC. URB., ST., AND LOC. GOV'T L. 1, 3 [hereinafter Overview of the Procure-
ment Process].
154. Kenney v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 353, 356 (1998) (citing Spezzaferro v.
Federal Aviation Admin., 807 F.2d 169, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
155. STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 6; cf Overview of the Procurement
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Second, enforcement of the writing requirement serves the relat-
ed goals of predictability, consistency, and uniformity.1' Finally,
routine enforcement of the writing requirement will lower trans-
action costs by decreasing litigation through its "channelling
function."'57 The channelling function is the manner in which a
writing requirement identifies an enforceable agreement and
thereby provides a simple test for a court to apply.15' Although
the channelling function has been questioned under the tradi-
tional statute of frauds, 5 9 this function makes the dispute sim-
pler regarding when one knows whether he will be bound.
1 60
Despite the advantages of enforcing the writing requirement
under the FAR, problems arise with a virtual statute of frauds.
The main criticism is that a statute of frauds will actually per-
petuate fraud.'61 The rebuttal to this criticism examines which
fraud is greater: the government's, perpetrated through enforce-
ment of the writing requirement, or the fraud against the gov-
Process, supra note 153, at 6 (noting that a repeated theme of the Model Procure-
ment Code is "the requirement of the filing of written records at numerous critical
stages in the procurement process [to prevent fraud]").
156. Cf Konigsberg Intl Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting
that "Congress' paramount goal'" in drafting the copyright statute of frauds in 17
U.S.C. § 204(a) was to increase the "predictability and certainty of ownership" (quot-
ing Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990))).
157. STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 8.
158. Id. at 8-9 (citing Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv.
799 (1941)).
159. See, e.g., id. at 8, 10 (noting that other requirements of contract, such as
consideration, must still be resolved and are therefore not simple, and further criti-
cizing the Statute of Frauds as resulting "in a mass of litigation"). Note, however,
that under the FAR the opposite should be true. That is, once it is determined that
the FAR governs, then the contract is automatically subject to the writing require-
ment. Unlike the traditional statute of frauds, there are no limitations on the FAR
writing requirement (with the minor suggested exception for fraud). Under the FAR,
for example, no limitation exists for "contracts not to be performed within a year."
See, e.g., Coan v. Orsinger, 265 F.2d 575, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (analyzing such a
limitation). The authors of Statute of Frauds acknowledge as much by suggesting
that their criticism may be muted "by making the application of the Statute clearer."
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 11.
160. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 9 (citing Fuller, supra note 158).
161. See, e.g., Halstead v. Murray, 547 A.2d 202, 204 (N.H. 1988) (recognizing the
criticism but noting that "the Statute of Frauds has been judicially interpreted in
such a way as to attempt to prevent fraud rather than to promote it"); see also
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 9 (noting that the Statute of Frauds has
'caused more injustice than it has prevented").
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ernment that inevitably follows if government contractors are
given the chance to offer oral evidence of a contract as a substi-
tute for a writing.162 To conduct this balance, three factors
should be considered to determine "whether a particular catego-
ry merits a special evidentiary requirement."'6 First, the "pecu-
nary importance of that category" must be examined.' Second,
the "intrinsic importance of that category" must be taken into
account. 65 Third, and finally, the "type of individual who will be
'protected' by the evidentiary requirement" should be identi-
fied.166 Applying these factors, the overwhelming preference in
favor of enforcing the writing requirement in the context of gov-
ernment contracts is readily seen. First, the pecuniary interest
involved is compelling if one considers the fact that government
contracts involve billions of dollars annually. 61 Second, the in-
trinsic importance of government contracts cannot be questioned
given the entities involved.168 Finally, the writing requirement
serves not only to protect the government but also to protect the
public in the use of their funds. 69
162. See, e.g., STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 7 ("[I]f it is thought that
the frauds which may occur as a consequence of allowing proof by parol evidence
more than outweigh the injustice which will occur as a result of not enforcing legiti-
mate bargains then the evidentiary function of the Statute of Frauds may still be a





167. See PacOrd, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (Nel-
son, J., dissenting); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324
(D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In 1994, federal procurement exceeded $400 billion and constituted
approximately 6.5% of the gross domestic product."); Levey, supra note 111, at 1 n.1
(noting that "in fiscal year 1991, the federal government entered into 20,152,308 con-
tract awards, modifications, and other actions worth $210,689,057,000" (citing FEDER-
AL PROCUREMENT DATA CENTER, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMINISTRATION FEDERAL PRO-
CUREMENT REPORT 2 (1992)).
168. See, e.g., JAMES F. NAGLE, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS: POLICY,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 2 (1987) (noting "the government contracts with virtually
all major companies in the country. These contractors employ at least one-third of
the nation's workers. Adding the affected subcontractors and suppliers compounds the
effect . . . ").
169. See Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 449 (11th Cir.
1982) (noting that '[if the rule were otherwise, the government would be put at
risk every time its agents failed to follow instructions to the last detail, and their
mistakes could impermissibly decrease the public treasury to the detriment of every
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A second criticism of a statute of frauds is that a writing re-
quirement "prescribes a method of contracting which is not in
conformity with the way business or transactions of that sort are
normally carried." 7 ° Although this criticism may have merit
under the traditional statute of frauds, it has no application in
the context of government contracts given the reality that most
government contracts are reduced to writing. In short, the nor-
mal business of government contracting conforms with the stat-
ute of frauds.
171
In formulating analogous regulations, drafters have chosen to
avoid a statute of frauds. The virtue of a writing requirement
has been debated over the last few years in the drafting commit-
tee for the revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.1 72 As the revised version presently reads, an implied-in-
fact contract could be found absent the otherwise required writ-
ing.'73 Another useful comparison comes from Article 11 of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), which explicitly rejects any statute of
frauds requirement. 7 4 The United States did not exercise its
option to preserve the statute of frauds for the sale of consumer
goods. 75 A feature of the writing requirement in the FAR distin-
guishing it from the one proposed for revised Article 2, as well
taxpayer").
170. STATUTE OF FRAUDS, supra note 151, at 11.
171. Cf Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539, 542 (1877) (noting that "there is no
class of cases in which a statute for preventing frauds and perijuries is more needed
than [government contracting]").
172. See U.C.C. § 2-201 n.1 (Council Draft No. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Council Draft
No. 3] (noting that the "[elarly drafts of revised Article 2 repealed the statute and
motions to restore it were defeated at the 1995 and 1996 annual meetings of the
Conference. The statute of frauds, however, was restored by the Drafting Committee
at the January, 1997 meeting . . .").
173. See U.C.C. § 2-201(c)(2)-(3) (Reporters Interim Draft Nov. 1999) (providing
for the enforcement of a contract, notwithstanding the writing requirement, if certain
circumstances arise that involve (1) an admission under oath by the party to be
bound, (2) goods paid for and accepted, or (3) goods "received and accepted").
174. See United Nations: Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, May, 1980, art. 11, 19 I.L.M. 668, 674 [hereinafter CISGI ("A contract of sale
need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other re-
quirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.").
175. See id. art. 12; id. art. 96, at 693-94; Council Draft No. 3, supra note 172, §
2-201 n.6.
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as the one absent from the CISG, is that the latter two involve
the sale of goods, which usually implicates a disparity of bar-
gaining power, whereas in the former context, sophisticated
parties sit at both sides of the bargaining table. 76 Based on this
distinction, the rationale for finding an implied-in-fact contract
in the context of consumer sales makes sense equitably but ar-
guably does not apply in the government contracts arena.
Giving up on a writing requirement because it tends to perpe-
trate a fraud is not the best answer in the context of government
contracts. Government contractors work in the field daily and
would not be susceptible to misplaced reliance on oral promises
if these same contractors knew of the writing requirement. The
better way to address fraud is to carve out a narrow exception to
the writing requirement when the requirement perpetuates
fraud, rather than prevents fraud.7 This solution protects
against fraud and maintains the other benefits that a writing re-
quirement serves, namely predictability, uniformity, and de-
creased transaction costs.
AN EXCEPTION FOR FRAUD
The writing requirement for government contracts should be
strictly, but not blindly, enforced'78 in light of the facts that
176. For an example of just such a distinction, see Deborah Kemp, Limitations
Upon the Software Producer's Rights: Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 16
RUTGERS COhIPUTER & TECH. L.J. 85, 114 n.123 (1990) (noting that "sophisticated"
parties arguably could be precluded from a "contract of adhesion analysis" because
"only a contract for consumer goods could be a contract of adhesion").
177. Another way to avoid the harsh consequences of a writing requirement is
through ratification. This narrow option can lead to enforcement of oral contracts if
"the head of the contracting activity," 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-3(b)(2) (1998), has knowledge
of the facts of the oral contract and accepts the otherwise unauthorized agreement.
In this situation, the oral promise has been ratified and is enforceable. See Willard
L. Boyd, HI, Implied-in-Fact Contract: Contractual Recovery Against the Government
Without an Express Agreement, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 84, 118 (1991). This option of
course should remain because the problem of policing a contracting officer's authority
is eliminated and arguably the FAR is complied with because the method of con-
tracting was de facto "otherwise authorized." 48 C.F.R. § 2.101. This option, however,
does not address the problem of the contracting officer who attempts to bind the
government orally without approval by the head of the government entity.
178. See NAGLE, supra note 168, at 545 ("Certainly uniformity is important both
to the government and to contractors but inflexibility, despite a universe of varied
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fraud "[ujnravels [e]verything, " 179 and is no stranger to govern-
ment contracts. 180 To maintain the benefits of a writing require-
ment in government contracts, but still prevent the hardships of
a per se rule, an exception for fraud should be carved out from
strict enforcement of the writing requirement when such en-
forcement would have the unintended and ironic result of perpe-
trating a fraud.181
Requiring fraud to excuse the absence of a writing to bind the
government serves two important purposes. First, the exception
directly answers the harshest criticism of enforcing a writing re-
quirement, namely that it may promote rather than prevent
fraud. 82 Second, the exception to the rule should be invoked only
in rare instances because the standard of fraud is so high, and
consequently the goals to be served by a writing requirement
will not be undermined. 1 The typical elements of actionable
fraud include: (1) a knowingly false statement of material fact;
(2) that induces reliance by the subsequently injured party,
causing them to do something they otherwise would not have
done; and (3) proximately causing the injured party's damage.' 8'
contracting problems, is misguided.").
179. Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(Voom of Products Liability Theory
in Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REV. 269, 280 (1999) (citing JOHN
M. FINNiS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RiGHTS 288 (1980)).
180. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that fraud has historically "afflict-
ed the federal procurement process"); Austin J. McGuigan & John M. Massameno,
Prosecuting Government Corruption Cases: Dangers and Pitfalls, 1984 A.B.A. SEC.
PUBL. CONT. L. & SEC. URB., ST. AND Loc. Govr L. 63 ("Government corruption is
nothing new.").
181. The general rules governing government contract officers typically are subject
to some sort of fraud exception. See, e.g., In re Metric Constructors, Inc., Comp. Gen.
Dec. B-229947 (25 Mar. 1998), 88-1 CPD 311 (deferring to the contracting officer's
discretion for determining a reasonable price unless there is fraud or bad faith); In
re Cherokee Enters., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-228330 (4 Dec. 1987), 87-2 CPD 552
(same).
182. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Hess v. Hess, 580 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (noting that
"[tihe elements of fraud are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance, (3)
an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) jus-
tifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the
recipient as the proximate result"); Ritchie v. Clappier, 326 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1982) ("The elements of fraud are a false representation made with intent
to defraud and reliance by the injured party on the misrepresentation.").
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The appropriate standard will strike the right balance between
enforcing the writing requirement to protect the government,
promote predictability, and relax the requirement to prevent
abuse by the government.
Three basic elements should make up the exception for fraud.
The first element should require that a false statement be made
by the government or its agent.'85 The falsity must be more than
the promise itself.'86 Rather, the falsity should relate to the abil-
ity of the contracting officer to contract without a writing. For
example, a contracting officer's statement that the deal did not
need a writing because the agent would handle the matter
would clearly be false because the agent does not have such
authority. Second, the false statement must be reasonably calcu-
lated to deceive and made directly or indirectly to the aggrieved
party. 87 This should prove the toughest prong to meet because
the typical case does not involve the contracting officer inten-
tionally misleading the other party, but rather involves igno-
rance of at least one of the contracting parties regarding the
scope of authority of the contracting officer to bind the govern-
ment. 88 Finally, the aggrieved party must actually and reason-
ably rely on the statement to his detriment.'89 Actual reliance
will be the easiest to demonstrate. If the government contractor
completed, or even began the work orally contracted for, he has
relied on the false statement to his detriment. The toughest part
of this prong will involve whether such reliance was reasonable.
185. See, e.g., Farrar v. Churchill, 135 U.S. 609, 615 (1890) (noting that for an
action in fraud to lie "[tihe representation must be in regard to a material fact,
[and] must be false . . .").
186. Cf Mid-South Cogeneration, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 926 F. Supp.
1327, 1339 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (requiring the alleged fraudulent conduct to be a false
promise made with the intention to defraud).
187. See, e.g., Hess, 580 A.2d at 359 (noting that the falsity must be made with
the intention of inducing the other contracting party to act).
188. The "typical case" is based on the presumption noted earlier that most con-
tracting officers are honest and act in good faith. See supra notes 153-54 and accom-
panying text.
189. See, e.g., Farrar, 135 U.S. at 615 (noting that the false statement "must be
acted upon by the other party in ignorance of its falsity and with a reasonable be-
lief that it was true"); Pearson v. Norton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (Cal. App. 1964)
(noting that the rightful reliance must result in damage); Hess, 580 A.2d at 359
(noting that the reliance must be justifiable).
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Requiring reasonable reliance, as opposed to justifiable reliance,
is inconsistent with the common law elements for actual fraud9
but consistent with the goal of making this exception difficult to
meet. In Field v. Mans,'9' the Court noted "that a person is justi-
fied in relying on a representation of fact 'although he might
have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made
an investigation." 92 Incorporating justifiable reliance into the
exception for strictly enforcing the writing requirement would
contravene a major premise of the agency authority argument
that those contracting with the government have a duty to as-
certain the scope of the contracting officer's authority.113 By
requiring reasonable reliance instead, the standard is objective,
measured against community standards, and more difficult to
meet.' This difficult burden can be met, however, if the falsity
with intent to deceive is proven, and the contractor made rea-
sonable efforts to verify the veracity of the contracting officer's
representations, but did not discover the falsity. With this said,
the actual fraud exception is a high standard, and rarely will be
met. Setting such a difficult standard is consistent with the
efficiency-promoting goals in government contracting and accom-
modates the criticism of stringently enforcing the writing re-
quirement in those exceptional cases of actual fraud in which
the writing requirement might otherwise be used to perpetrate a
fraud.
On the facts of PacOrd, it is clear that the subcontractor re-
ceived a bad deal, assuming there really was a promise by the
contracting officer guaranteeing payment. More information is
needed to determine if the government's conduct rose to the
level of fraud. Absent facts that show the contracting officer told
PacOrd that he did have authority to contract orally, the likeli-
hood that PacOrd would meet the fraud exception seems slim.
190. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70 (1995).
191. 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
192. Id. at 70 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976)).
193. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
194. See, e.g., Edward R. Christian, Recent Decision, Howard v. Mutual Savings,
45 ALA. L. REV. 303, 305 (1993) (noting that the standard "was, of course, an objec-
tive standard," and that if the fraud could have been discovered had ordinary care
been taken, then the plaintiff should not recover).
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More important to this analysis is the telling observation that
had the writing requirement been strictly enforced over time,'95
and therefore, strictly adhered to by government contractors, the
subcontractor in the instant case never would have been
harmed. The subcontractor never would have performed the
work, or at least, would have held out until it obtained the
promise in writing.
CONCLUSION
The holding in PacOrd has opened the door for increased
uncertainty in government contracts regarding when the govern-
ment will be bound in the absence of a writing, and when the
contracting officer acts beyond the scope of his authority. If the
past is prologue, then history provides two important principles
to guide the analysis. First, contracting officers cannot bind the
government beyond the scope of their authority. Second, writing
requirements have been circumvented to enforce oral contracts,
but only to the extent consistent with serving the goals of the
writing requirement. The writing requirement in the FAR serves
the goals of preventing fraud, increasing certainty of contract
and uniformity of practice, and decreasing transaction costs. The
writing requirement should be relaxed only when the regulation
as applied goes against its goal of preventing fraud. This relax-
ation should occur only to the extent necessary to correct the ill
while preserving the benefits.
Arnie Bruce Mason
195. That is, if cases like Narva Harris did not stray from the general writing
requirement.
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